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espite an impressive naval modernization over the past two decades, the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently possesses little in the way 
of force-projection capabilities.1 The development of force projection through 
the acquisition of such platforms as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships 
is essential if PLAN forces, as they modernize and mature, are to engage in the 
full spectrum of traditional and nontraditional operations needed to protect 
Chinese interests, regionally and abroad. At this point, the most visible mani-
festations of the PLAN’s desire to possess this type of force-projection capability 
are its Type 071 amphibious transport dock (LPD), commissioned in November 
2007; a second Type 071 hull now under construction; and, most significant, the 
ongoing refurbishment of an incomplete, Soviet-built, Kuznetsov-class aircraft 
carrier at Dalian. These ships represent core elements of the PLAN’s future force-
projection requirements. Along with follow-on platforms, they will provide the 
capability to employ sea-based airpower and conduct expeditionary operations 
beyond the range of older and less capable amphibious vessels, as well as that of 
land-based air cover. 
However, China’s desire to possess modern force-projection capabilities for its 
navy is also the source of considerable speculation and misunderstanding. This 
is particularly true for China’s aircraft carrier program. Speculation runs from 
forward-leaning predictions that by the early 2020s China could have as many 
as five aircraft carriers, including two nuclear-powered hulls, to a recent predic-
tion from an Australian policy research think tank that despite evidence to the 
Daniel J. Kostecka
PLA Doctrine and the Employment of Sea-Based Airpower
FROM THE SEA
D
Aircraft carriers symbolize a country’s overall strength. They are also the 
core of the navy’s combined-arms sea operations. Building carriers has all 
along been a matter of concern for the Chinese people. To modernize our 
national defense and build a perfect weaponry and equipment system, we 
have to consider the development of carriers.
ADMIRAL LIU HUAQING, MEMOIRS OF LIU HUAQING (AUGUST 2004)
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contrary the Chinese are not serious about building aircraft carriers, because it 
would be “dumb for them to do so.”2
China’s LPD program has not generated anything like the controversy accom-
panying the aircraft carrier. However, it has received a significant amount of at-
tention, if for no other reason than the type represents a modern, long-range 
expeditionary platform that—unlike most of China’s other naval acquisitions of 
the past two decades—seems to have been designed from the outset for missions 
other than supporting an attack on Taiwan. Also, while smaller and much less 
capable than a true aircraft carrier, China’s single Type 071 LPD is the PLAN’s 
first true deck-aviation ship, in that unlike destroyers and frigates, it can operate 
a larger number and more diverse mix of helicopters against a larger set of mis-
sions. Modern force projection is essential for China to have a sustained naval 
presence away from Chinese waters, whether in the South China Sea, the Indian 
Ocean, or anywhere else. Additionally, authoritative publications from the PLAN, 
as well as the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) National Defense University and 
Academy of Military Sciences, provide clues regarding how the navy intends to 
employ these platforms in both traditional and nontraditional ways. It is neces-
sary to understand China’s future force-projection capabilities, in light of PLA 
doctrine, to predict the types of missions that Chinese aircraft carriers and large 
amphibious vessels are likely to be given.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Probably the most commonly cited example of China’s desire to expand its naval 
power beyond Chinese coastal waters is Beijing’s pursuit of aircraft carriers ca-
pable of operating conventional fixed-wing fighter aircraft.3 The PLAN has been 
interested in acquiring aircraft carriers for decades, but financial, technological, 
political, and strategic constraints have prevented serious progress. Outside of 
China, discussion of this issue is highly polarized, to say the least. To some, Chi-
na’s pursuit of aircraft carriers represents a direct challenge to the United States 
and clearly indicates that China seeks to project naval power into the Indian 
Ocean and western Pacific. To others, China’s aircraft carrier program is noth-
ing more than a quixotic exercise in national vanity; in their view, any Chinese 
carrier would be nothing more than a nationalistic showpiece, with very little 
operational value. 
Further confusing the situation is Beijing’s own obfuscation. Despite years of 
interest in aircraft carriers and, evidence indicates, experimentation with aircraft 
carrier technology, as late as 2004 Chinese officials, including General Xiong 
Guangkai, then deputy chief of the General Staff, stated that China did not plan 
to build carriers.4 One year later, the unfinished Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft 
carrier Varyag, which China had purchased from Ukraine in 1998, went into dry 
dock at Dalian Shipyard, in northern China, for an extensive refit that continues 
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at this writing. Today anyone with access to the internet can track the exten-
sive modifications to the ship in photographs posted on a number of blogs and 
websites. Five years after the ship first entered dry dock, even the most skeptical 
observers are convinced that China intends to put the ship into operation in the 
not-very-distant future. 
Roughly coincident with work on Varyag, Chinese rhetoric on this issue has 
shifted considerably, with officials and the media discussing aircraft carriers with 
increasing candor.5 These include positive statements in April 2009 regarding air-
craft carriers by Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Admiral Wu Shengli, com-
mander of the PLAN, as well as a March 2010 editorial in the English-language 
version of the Global Times stating that it was time for the world to prepare for a 
Chinese aircraft carrier.6 Earlier, in November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua 
of the PLA had asserted China’s right to possess an aircraft carrier: “The question 
is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft 
carrier. . . . Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike another country, we 
will not use it to pursue global deployment or global reach.”7 
In addition to Varyag, China is also developing the aircraft that will compose 
the ship’s air wing. Press and internet reports claim China is producing a Chinese 
carrier fighter based on the Russian Su-33 Flanker D, designated the J-15; accord-
ing to one website, the first prototype of this aircraft made its maiden flight on 31 
August 2009 and its first takeoff from a land-based “ski jump” (runway ending in 
an upward ramp) on 6 May 2010.8 While the exact dates of these flights cannot 
be confirmed, recent internet pictures show a Chinese Flanker-variant prototype 
in flight with the same canards and shortened tail stinger as the Russian carrier-
capable Su-33; a video of the prototype flying is also on the web. While externally 
the J-15 appears to be a near copy of the Su-33, internally it likely possesses the 
same radar and avionics as China’s domestically produced land-based Flanker, 
the J-11B. It will probably be capable of employing a full suite of China’s most ad-
vanced air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, including the PL-12 active-radar-
homing, medium-range, air-to-air missile.9 
As an airborne-early-warning (AEW) platform, China may acquire, according 
to the Russian press, nine Ka-31 AEW helicopters. However, internet photographs 
indicate that China has fielded a prototype AEW variant of the Z-8 medium-lift 
helicopter.10 It is unknown which will be chosen as the primary AEW helicopter 
for the PLAN’s aircraft carrier force. It is possible the PLAN sees an indigenous 
platform based on the Z-8 as a long-term solution, with Ka-31s from Russia as 
gap fillers. Alternatively, the Z-8 prototype could also be a test bed for an AEW 
variant of a more modern helicopter, such as the developmental Z-15.11 Any of 
these would be much less capable than a fixed-wing AEW platform, such as the 
America E-2C Hawkeye. 
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PLA THEORY AND AIRCRAFT CARRIER EMPLOYMENT
How the PLAN would employ an aircraft carrier is open to speculation; these 
versatile platforms can perform a variety of missions. The development in China 
of a theoretical construct of how the PLAN would employ aircraft carriers dates 
back to at least the early 1970s, when Liu Huaqing led a feasibility study on the 
construction of aircraft carriers. Later, as the service’s commander (from 1982 to 
1988), Admiral Liu pushed for the serious study of aircraft carrier design, assert-
ing that given China’s more than three million square kilometers of sea territory, 
aircraft carriers were necessary to safeguard the nation’s rights and interests at sea, 
enhance national prestige, and add to the nation’s peacetime deterrent posture.12 
In 1987, Admiral Liu directed the establishment at the Guangzhou Naval Vessels 
Academy of a course to train PLAN pilots to command surface combatants; the 
first class of nine officers graduated with bachelor’s degrees in ship command in 
1991.13 Apparently, the PLAN has chosen to follow the American model of select-
ing its aircraft carrier commanding officers from the naval aviation community. 
After commanding the PLAN, Admiral Liu served as vice chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (from 1989 until retirement in 1997); there he continued 
to argue the case for aircraft carriers.14 
More recently, authoritative PLA publications on this issue, including 战役
学 (Science of Campaigns, in 2000 and 2006 editions) and 战役理论学习指南 
(Campaign Theory Study Guide), provide clues into Chinese thinking on this is-
sue. It is possible, by studying these and other publications, to glean insights into 
how the PLAN is thinking about employing aircraft carriers operationally. 
It is in the South China Sea that one should expect first to see the PLAN employ 
aircraft carriers. While China’s military modernization is primarily geared to de-
terring independence-minded forces on Taiwan, the only combat that the PLAN 
has actually engaged in over the past forty years has been in the South China Sea. 
These clashes occurred in 1974, when Chinese forces captured the Paracel Is-
lands from South Vietnam; in 1988, when PLAN forces captured Johnson Reef in 
the Spratly Islands and sank three Vietnamese supply vessels; and in 1995, when 
PLAN forces occupied Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines.15 Recent state-
ments from Beijing—in response to expressions of concern from Washington 
over competing maritime claims there and the potential threat to navigation—
regarding China’s sovereignty over islands and surrounding waters in the South 
China Sea have brought new and increased international attention to this area of 
key Chinese national interest.16 China claims a substantial portion of the South 
China Sea as its territorial waters, and competition is growing among the na-
tions of the region over fishing waters and potential oil and natural-gas deposits. 
Accordingly, the PLAN has a need for an ability to project force and to employ 
sea-based airpower against enemy-held islands and reefs. PLA doctrine clearly 
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lists providing air cover to landing operations as a primary wartime mission, a 
mission the Chinese see for PLAN aircraft carriers. Both editions of Science of 
Campaigns discuss the importance of aircraft carriers in providing air cover to 
amphibious invasions against islands and reefs beyond the range of land-based 
aircraft, a clear reference to their potential use in the South China Sea. The 2000 
edition points to the employment of USS Independence (CV 62) in this role dur-
ing Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 invasion of Grenada.17
Science of Campaigns also clearly states that three-dimensional attacks are es-
sential to executing the PLA’s “coral-island-assault campaign” (对珊瑚岛礁进攻
战役) against islands and reefs in the South China Sea during a regional conflict. 
The 2006 edition of the book, which first detailed this campaign, discusses re-
quirements for effective seaborne 
command and control, three-
dimensional encirclement, and the 
complex logistics support required 
for assaults on coral islands and 
reefs far from the mainland.18 An 
aircraft carrier, with its fighter and rotary-wing aviation assets and command-
and-control facilities, would be tailor-made for the purpose. Additionally, even 
one or two carriers would be sufficient to enforce China’s territorial claims in 
the South China Sea against such competitors as Vietnam, the Philippines, or 
Malaysia, should Beijing attempt again to acquire territory as it did in 1974, 1988, 
and 1995.
A similar analysis appears in a book published in 1998, Winning High-Tech 
Local Wars: Must Reading for Military Officers. It asserts that amphibious forces 
engaged in “long distance” landing operations should be protected by one or two 
aircraft carrier groups stationed 100–150 nautical miles from the shore of the 
objective. In this discussion it is apparent the authors had in mind non-Taiwan 
landing operations, since the Taiwan Strait is only about one hundred nautical 
miles wide.19 Royal Navy aircraft carriers in the Falklands War in 1982 (despite 
their small and austere air groups) and British and French carriers in the 1957 
Suez crisis (notwithstanding air wings less capable than those of contemporary 
U.S. carriers) demonstrated that even limited carrier-based airpower can be cru-
cial in regional conflicts beyond the range of effective land-based air cover.20 
Campaign Theory Study Guide discusses the employment of aircraft carri-
ers to protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in a “sea-traffic-protection 
campaign.” As evidenced by the ongoing deployment of PLAN warships to the 
Gulf of Aden, this campaign is increasing in importance for the Chinese. In its 
support, Campaign Theory Study Guide argues that the PLA should develop a 
mixed fleet, with an aircraft carrier, missile destroyers, and nuclear-powered 
Overall, it is likely that China views the pri-
mary role of its carriers as regional in nature
—defending China’s maritime claims in 
East Asia.
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attack submarines. The guide describes a number of missions to be executed for 
sea-traffic protection, including air defense and antisubmarine and antishipping 
warfare, all capabilities that an aircraft carrier could bring to the campaign. A 
carrier group could also control designated sea areas to ensure the safe passage 
of merchant ships and air forces are considered a key component of what the 
authors term “zone cover” forces.21 Additionally, while the sea-traffic-protection 
campaign is described as defensive, all PLA defensive campaigns have offensive 
components. In this case, PLA doctrine describes the importance of organizing 
sea and air forces to attack enemy elements that pose a threat to sea transport.22 
While carrier-based aviation would not carry sole responsibility for such offen-
sive operations, it could provide a valuable supplement to surface ships, subma-
rines, and land-based aircraft, depending on the type of threat and the proximity 
of operating areas to Chinese bases.
Beyond specific mentions of aircraft carriers in PLA doctrine, books like Sci-
ence of Campaigns and Campaign Theory Study Guide are replete with references 
to the employment of air forces for air defense and offensive strike, including 
in a Taiwan contingency. In the latter scenario, the missions discussed for both 
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation can likely be handled with land-
based aircraft. However, in non-Taiwan contingencies fought in the maritime do-
main farther from the Chinese mainland, it may be necessary to meet air require-
ments at least in part with sea-based aviation. Science of Campaigns discusses the 
employment of naval air forces for both strike and air-superiority missions in 
the antiship and counter-sea-traffic campaigns. Additionally, Air Raid and Anti–
Air Raid in the 21st Century (2002) discusses the importance of long-range fleet 
bomber and fighter forces in counterstrike operations in the joint anti-air-raid 
campaign, specifically in attacking sea-based flight decks and in providing air 
defense for warships.23 While none of these references refers specifically to sea-
based aviation, the stated requirement for naval aviation in these campaigns can 
be seen as an implicit reference to aircraft carriers, due to the limitations of land-
based airpower in long-range maritime operations. 
Overall, it is likely that China views the primary role of its carriers as regional 
in nature—defending China’s maritime claims in East Asia. This is consistent 
with PLA doctrine, which envisions the use of carriers in providing air cover 
to long-distance landing operations, primarily in the context of scenarios in the 
South China Sea. Discussion of the employment of aircraft carriers in the sea-
traffic-protection campaign is applicable to a wider set of scenarios. However, 
it is in the South China Sea, with its disputed maritime claims and potential 
threats to Chinese shipping even in regional conflicts in which China is neutral, 
that aircraft carriers would most likely be employed to protect China’s SLOCs. A 
primarily regional role for aircraft carriers is also consistent with the theme in 
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official and unofficial Chinese media of the need for carriers to protect China’s 
extensive maritime territory in the East and South China Seas. As one Shanghai-
based military expert states, “Our carrier will definitely not engage with powerful 
U.S. aircraft carrier fighting groups. But it is enough to be a symbolic threat among 
neighboring countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines who have ter-
ritorial disputes with China.”24 This line of discussion is also consistent with Ad-
miral Liu Huaqing’s primary argument for aircraft carriers.25 Rear Admiral Zhang 
Zhaozhang elaborated in April 2009:
The Chinese navy does not need to fight in the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean 
or at the center of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese navy follows a proactive defense 
strategy. However, in order to defend the security of the national territory, marine 
territories, and the waters within the First Island Chain, this proactive defense strat-
egy does not mean that our navy only stays within the First Island Chain. Only when 
the Chinese navy goes beyond the First Island Chain, will China be able to expand its 
strategic depth of security for its marine territories.26 
It is highly unlikely for three reasons that China will seek to use its carriers to 
assert U.S.-style sea dominance in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere in what Chi-
nese sources term “far-seas operations.”27 First, current estimates are that China 
is going to build three or four carriers. Since it is highly unlikely that all of them 
will be combat ready at the same time, they would find themselves outnum-
bered and outgunned by the Indian Navy. India itself is looking to field a force 
of three aircraft carriers, but in the Indian Ocean they would be supported by 
land-based airpower, including AEW and intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance platforms. They could call on India’s fleet of submarines for additional 
support. China’s carriers, by contrast, would be operating beyond the support of 
land-based airpower, with at best minimal support from China’s small force of 
nuclear-powered attack submarines.28 This also does not even address the possi-
bility of American involvement, which would only make the situation less tenable 
for PLAN carrier groups operating in the Indian Ocean in wartime. Additionally, 
even if all of China’s carriers were combat ready, security concerns nearer home 
would likely preclude the PLAN’s surging all of its carriers and their escorts into 
the Indian Ocean, leaving the PLAN significantly weakened vis-à-vis powerful 
East Asian competitors.
Second, there is also the question of just how much combat capability PLAN 
carriers will bring to a traditional force-on-force conflict. It can be safely assumed 
that at the very least the PLAN’s first two carriers (to include ex-Varyag), and 
possibly later ones, will employ a short takeoff but arrested recovery (STOBAR)
—that is, a ski-jump design. This represents a significant limitation, because 
ski-jump-equipped carriers are far less capable than U.S. Navy–style catapult-
assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) ships, which employ powerful 
Kostecka.indd   17 4/19/2011   2:03:23 PM
7
Kostecka: From the Sea
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
 18  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
steam catapults to launch heavily laden fighter and strike aircraft. STOBAR car-
riers are forced to operate rotary-wing AEW platforms, which are far less capable 
than fixed-wing AEW aircraft in terms of range, operating altitude, and the size of 
the radars they can carry, thereby severely inhibiting the situational awareness of 
a battle group. For regional operations (e.g., in the South China Sea) this would 
not be as much of a problem, because PLAN carriers could count on support 
from land-based AEW aircraft like the KJ-2000 and KJ-200, now in service in 
the PLAAF. In the Indian Ocean this would likely not be the case. Recent internet 
reporting claims China has fielded a prototype fixed-wing AEW platform based 
on the twin-engine Y-7 transport, which is at least superficially similar to the U.S. 
E-2C, indicating the potential for future carrier use.29 This raises the possibility 
that China is looking to field CATOBAR carriers in the future and that its carrier 
force will ultimately include a mix of CATOBAR and STOBAR ships. However, 
the Y-7 is considerably larger than the E-2C, itself a challenging aircraft to oper-
ate off the U.S. Navy’s large carriers. This means that if China is going to field a 
carrier-capable AEW platform based on the Y-7, the airframe will likely require 
significant modifications before it is ready for employment at sea.30 
Third, although the J-15 itself may be able to employ a wide variety of air-to-
air and air-to-surface munitions, fighters operating from STOBAR carriers are 
limited in the fuel and weapons they can carry and so primarily defend their 
battle groups, rather than acting offensively. Again, in a regional conflict where 
land-based strike aircraft (such as the JH-7A, H-6G, J-11B, and Su-30MKK/MK2) 
can be called upon for offensive strikes, this is not a big problem. Outside of East 
Asia, however, China could not use land-based strike aircraft without air bases in 
foreign nations.31 STOBAR carriers, for their part, cannot generate as many sor-
ties as CATOBAR carriers, because they cannot simultaneously launch multiple 
aircraft, and the Kuznetsov and similar designs cannot carry air groups as large as 
those of American carriers.32 
These disadvantages, however, are not crucial for regional force projection, 
because land-based airpower would be available. PLAN carriers, therefore, would 
likely operate against opponents like Vietnam, in a supporting role—antishipping, 
island seizure, and sea-traffic protection—as opposed to serving as the centerpiece 
of offensive fleets deployed thousands of miles beyond Chinese waters. 
VERTICAL ASSAULT: AMPHIBIOUS AIRPOWER
With approximately sixty ships of the type displacing over a thousand tons, in-
cluding twenty-six landing ships, tank (LSTs) of over four thousand tons, as well 
as numerous smaller craft, the PLAN possesses one of the world’s largest am-
phibious assault forces. However, it has very little capacity for vertical assault, due 
to a lack of deck-based aviation. Modernization of this force over the past two 
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decades has been steady, with the arrival of Type 072II and 072III LSTs and Type 
073IV landing ships, medium (LSMs). However, since most of the new ships have 
replaced older and less capable ships, overall lift capacity has not increased sig-
nificantly; it is currently no more than two divisions’ worth of troops (depending 
on the combat loadout).33 This is nowhere near enough to execute an amphibi-
ous assault against Taiwan, which would have to be a combined-arms landing on 
a scale similar to that of the Normandy invasion of June 1944. However, China 
could employ its current force of LSTs and LSMs in island-assault scenarios, such 
as the seizure of one of Taiwan’s offshore islands (perhaps Jinmen or Matsu) or 
of small islands in the South Chi-
na Sea in a conflict with Vietnam 
or the Philippines. However, their 
shallow draft and lack of aviation 
facilities (LSTs have helicopter 
landing pads but not hangars) make them less than ideal for assault operations 
beyond China’s littoral, such as in a coral-island campaign, and wholly unsuited 
for long-range expeditionary operations beyond East Asian waters or for nontra-
ditional security operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HA/DR).34 An article in the July 2010 edition of 舰船知识 (Naval and Merchant 
Ships) states that large amphibious assault ships are necessary for contemporary 
distant-sea operations, HA/DR, and amphibious missions against islands far 
from naval and air bases, where such ships would serve as platforms for smaller 
amphibious vessels, vertical assault, and command and control.35
China’s intention to address the gap in the PLAN’s modern long-range expedi-
tionary capability was first made public on 22 December 2006, with the launching 
of the Type 071 Kunlunshan (LPD 998).36 The Type 071 LPD offers a significant 
increase in lift capacity and, just as important, the capability to employ a small 
but flexible air group of helicopters in assault and attack roles. With its long range 
and large capacity, the Type 071 LPD can operate far from China’s shores, engag-
ing in a wide range of missions, from amphibious assault and vertical envelop-
ment (the insertion of troops by airdrop or air landing) to humanitarian aid to 
areas stricken by natural disasters and evacuation of Chinese citizens trapped in 
war-torn nations.37 However, with only one ship operational and a second under 
construction, long-range assault capability is still quite limited. It is unknown 
how many LPDs the PLAN intends to build, with estimates ranging from two 
ships to eight.38 
In addition to the Type 071 LPD, the press reports that China plans to build 
the Type 081 LHD (helicopter assault ship), similar in size and capability to the 
French Mistral-class LHD, or approximately half the size of the U.S. Navy Wasp 
class. In June 2007, American defense analyst Richard Fisher, of the International 
How the PLAN would employ an aircraft 
carrier is open to speculation; these versatile 
platforms can perform a variety of missions.
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Assessment and Strategy Center, reported that Chinese sources at an interna-
tional maritime trade show in Singapore (IMDEX-07) claimed that the Type 081 
LHD would displace approximately twenty thousand tons, have the capacity to 
transport five hundred troops, and be configured for helicopter-based vertical 
assault.39 A three-part series of articles in the Chinese journal 当代海军 (Modern 
Navy) asserts the importance of developing a balanced force of amphibious as-
sault ships of both the LPD and LHD types, due to their complementary capabili-
ties, citing the U.S. Navy’s force of LPDs, LSDs, and LHA/LHDs as an example.40 
Chinese authorities, including Admiral Liu, have also speculated on the utility 
of helicopter carriers, either as versatile platforms in themselves or as stepping-
stones to aircraft carriers proper.41 
Beyond press speculation, very little is known about the Type 081 program 
in terms of how many platforms the PLAN will acquire (if any) or what capa-
bilities they would possess. Chinese sources at IMDEX-07 stated that China had 
the capability to construct a helicopter assault ship of the type. This is no doubt 
true, given likely similarities in hull design between the Types 071 and 081. The 
July 2010 Naval and Merchant Ships article already mentioned calls for a Chinese 
LHD that would approximate the USS Wasp class in size (approximately forty 
thousand tons) and capability (up to forty helicopters and one thousand troops) 
but without the specialized facilities to operate fixed-wing aircraft (for Wasp, the 
V-22, AV-8B, and F-35, or Joint Strike Fighter).42 In any case, China has yet to begin 
construction on such a platform, much less integration into its force structure.43 
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS
The highest projections for modern Chinese amphibious assault ships are for 
eight Type 071 LPDs and six Type 081 LHDs, but American, Indian, and Taiwan-
ese defense analysts have all assessed that the PLAN will acquire six Type 071s and 
three Type 081s. Fisher claims that China intends to build three amphibious task 
groups, each based around one Type 081 and two 071s.44 It is possible (perhaps 
likely) that these analysts obtained their information from the same source—they 
may even be quoting one another—and that the projection of three Type 081 
LHDs and six Type 071 LPDs probably represents a high-end estimate for the 
Chinese navy’s future long-range amphibious force. A force of this size would 
permit the PLAN to field something akin to three American-style expedition-
ary strike groups, if it desired to organize its forces in such a manner. While this 
sounds impressive, in reality it represents enough lift for only between 4,500 and 
6,500 troops, about one of the South Sea Fleet’s two marine brigades. Moreover, 
that estimate assumes that all of the ships are operational and fully mission ca-
pable at the same time, a rare occurrence in any navy. It should also be noted 
that such a force could employ in total between forty and seventy helicopters of 
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various types, depending on mission requirements. Yet the PLAN only has about 
thirty-five rotary-wing aircraft of all types, most of which are smaller Z-9 and 
Ka-28 helicopters, geared toward antisubmarine warfare and search and rescue.45 
The PLAN’s current inventory of fifteen Z-8 medium-lift helicopters is wholly in-
adequate to support an expanded force of amphibious-assault vessels. The PLAN 
needs to address this weakness if it is to field a robust vertical-assault capability. 
The entrance into service of additional Z-8s, a more modern heavy-lift design 
reported to be in development, or a militarized version of the modern medium 
utility helicopter, the Z-15, currently in codevelopment with Eurocopter, might 
help in this regard.46
While some analysts speculate that one of the primary missions of China’s fu-
ture fleet of oceangoing amphibious vessels would be to contribute to an invasion 
of Taiwan (providing a credible means to assault Taiwan’s east coast), it is unlikely 
the PLAN envisions a Taiwan scenario as the primary mission for LPD 998 or 
any future vessels of similar capacity. First, while the notion of employing such 
vessels against Taiwan’s exposed eastern side is intriguing at first glance, it would 
mean deploying a significant number of the PLAN’s most modern warships
—not only its most modern assault ships but also escort vessels—into the Philip-
pine Sea, where they would be highly vulnerable to U.S. attack submarines. Sec-
ond, as stated above, even three LHDs and six LPDs would be able to carry only 
about a brigade of marines. The Chinese would need far more, as well as the nec-
essary supplies, in order to present a credible threat and sustain operations once 
a bridgehead was established. The lift that would be needed is far beyond even 
the most forward-leaning estimates of China’s intentions. Third, it is unlikely the 
PLAN would be willing to risk these vessels as part of a more conventional as-
sault across the narrow confines of the Taiwan Strait, where they would be at risk 
from Taiwan navy fast attack craft and coastal-defense antiship cruise missiles. 
Fourth, the fact that LPD 998 is in not the East Sea Fleet but the South Sea Fleet 
(based almost twice as far from the Philippine Sea, where it would need to oper-
ate to assault Taiwan’s east coast) is highly suggestive of the platform’s roles and 
missions. Future ships in this class could be based with the East Sea Fleet, but the 
operational problems stated above would still apply.
As with aircraft carriers, for the missions of the Type 071 LPD and similar future 
platforms one needs to look to the South China Sea and not to Taiwan. Campaign 
Theory Study Guide, Science of Campaigns, and Winning High-Tech Local Wars 
all discuss the use of rotary-wing forces in the vertical-envelopment role. While 
China’s military modernization is primarily aimed at deterring independence-
minded forces on Taiwan, it is to the three-dimensional assault role in the PLA’s 
coral-island-assault campaign, beyond the range of land-based helicopters, 
that large assault ships such as LPDs and LHDs are best suited.47 Their aviation 
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capabilities, large troop- and cargo-carrying capacity, and command-and-control 
facilities are ideal for this sort of campaign.48 In November 2008 and June 2009, 
for instance, LPD 998, in the company of destroyers, frigates, and supply ships, 
conducted long-distance patrols of the disputed waters in the Spratly Islands; 
PLAN marines carried out at least one island-seizure exercise. This is suggestive 
of the primary operational orientation of this warship.49
China could employ aircraft carriers in a similar way. It is unlikely that the 
PLAN, apparently planning an LHD type, views vertical-assault operations as a 
primary mission for an aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, vertical assault represents a 
legitimate and proven use for carriers. The U.S. Navy has often employed them 
in this role. Notable examples include the launching of helicopters from USS 
Nimitz (CVN 68) in 1980 for Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed mission to res-
cue American hostages in Iran; RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti in 1994, when 
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) embarked soldiers and helicopters from the 
10th Mountain Division; and the early stages of ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, 
when USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) served as the “afloat forward staging base” for U.S. 
Army and Air Force special-operations troops and helicopters.50 The author of 
“How Big a Role Do Aircraft Carriers Play in Noncombat Operations?,” published 
in 2009, discusses the role of Eisenhower off Haiti in 1994, arguing that it is some-
times necessary to reorganize a carrier’s air group for nontraditional security mis-
sions, removing some or all of its fixed-wing aircraft to make room for additional 
helicopters.51
Additionally, there are references in Campaign Theory Study Guide to the use 
of helicopter-carrying vessels (e.g., converted merchant ships, as mentioned in 
the sea-traffic-protection campaign) to conduct a variety of missions.52 Amphib-
ious assault ships, particularly LHDs, with their rotary-wing aviation capabilities, 
could represent valuable supplements to aircraft carriers and other surface com-
batants engaged in SLOC protection. The recent deployment of LPD 998 to the 
Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy operations with a mix of Z-8 and Z-9 helicopters 
specially fitted with gun and rocket pods was an excellent example of such a use 
of an assault ship in sea-traffic protection. Throughout the PLAN counterpiracy 
mission, helicopters have been crucial for shuttling special-operations forces to 
merchant ships and in warding off suspicious boats.53 LPD 998, employing Z-8s, 
can accomplish these missions more effectively than destroyers and frigates em-
ploying smaller Z-9s and Ka-28s. 
NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS FOR SEA-BASED AIRPOWER 
In addition to combat missions in regional conflicts, it is likely that China views 
aircraft carriers and large assault ships as important platforms for nontradition-
al security missions. As stated above, the best example so far is the decision to 
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deploy LPD 998 on counterpiracy duty in the Gulf of Aden as part of China’s 
sixth counterpiracy rotation. Other nontraditional missions include maritime 
antiterrorism, prevention of maritime transportation of weapons of mass de-
struction, maritime peacekeeping, HA/DR, and noncombatant evacuation oper-
ations (NEOs). While it is unlikely that the PLAN views such missions as primary 
roles, these are tasks that navies often find themselves engaged in on a day-to-
day basis. Nontraditional security missions also provide a useful occasion for the 
PLAN to operate in East Asian waters and beyond in a manner that does not in-
flame “China threat” rhetoric. In fact, they would present China as a responsible 
state that takes international-security issues seriously and is willing to promote 
cooperation and stability.54 These missions also provide useful on-the-job train-
ing for the PLAN; Captain Xu Ping writes in the influential journal 中国军事科
学 (China Military Science) that nonwar military actions are becoming one of the 
best forms of training, testing, and enhancing the core military functions that are 
necessary for winning local wars under “informatized” conditions.55
A significant example is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It is 
known that China was embarrassed in the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami when the PLAN was obliged by a lack of suitable platforms 
to stand on the sidelines as several other countries, including the United States, 
Japan, India, and Thailand, deployed naval forces to provide humanitarian relief. 
As China develops its force of amphibious assault ships and eventually aircraft 
carriers, it is likely that they will be employed in HA/DR in East Asia and outside 
China’s regional seas in areas such as the Indian Ocean. One Chinese article dis-
cussing the role of naval forces in disaster relief specifically names Cyclone Nargis 
(which struck Burma on 27 April 2008). An article on the 2004 tsunami, which 
struck Indonesia primarily, points out that the tidal waves also hit India and Sri 
Lanka.56 The deployment of a task group built around one or more assault vessels 
to the Indian Ocean to provide disaster relief could go a long way in quieting fears 
of a growing regional Chinese military presence. Participation in HA/DR opera-
tions in the Indian Ocean would also allow the PLAN to establish an increased 
presence in the region in a nonintrusive, even friendly, manner that would likely 
find approval within the international community. Additionally, like the ongoing 
counterpiracy deployments, such missions would provide valuable experience in 
operating in close proximity to other major naval forces.57
While aircraft carriers lack some of the specialized support and logistics capa-
bilities of amphibious assault ships for HA/DR operations, China will still likely 
employ its carriers for this mission in East Asia and possibly farther abroad. Chi-
nese commentators have noted the important role that USS Abraham Lincoln 
(CVN 72) played in relief operations after the Indonesian tsunami in 2004. The 
participation of the light carrier USS Saipan (CVL 48) in disaster relief in the 
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Caribbean and Mexico in 1954 and 1955 is also discussed.58 While the launching 
of even a single, refurbished, Soviet-era aircraft carrier will cause some to point 
to a growing China threat, the positive news of the deployment of a PLAN aircraft 
carrier to a coastal disaster area in East Asia will be a diplomatic counterweight 
to all but the most extreme trepidations. As Professors Andrew Erickson and An-
drew Wilson of the U.S. Naval War College state, “The aftermath of the 2004 
tsunami has convinced many Chinese that good carriers make good neighbors 
and they are a necessity if China’s force structure available for deployment to 
Southeast Asia is to match and complement its diplomatic initiatives.”59 
Beyond HA/DR, aircraft carriers and modern amphibious assault ships are well 
suited to a variety of other nontraditional security operations as well. The Octo-
ber 2008 issue of Modern Navy featured a spirited debate among three Chinese 
naval experts (including Senior 
Captain Li Jie of the Navy Military 
Studies Research Institute) regard-
ing the advantages of amphibious 
assault ships over aircraft carriers. 
The discussion revolves around 
the suitability of amphibious assault ships in such operations as maritime anti-
terrorism, counterpiracy, prevention of maritime transportation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and maritime peacekeeping, Li arguing that using an aircraft 
carrier to execute such missions is like using an “ox cleaver to kill a chicken.”60 
Li also points out that amphibious assault ships appear far less threatening than 
aircraft carriers, while providing greater flexibility afforded by their air and sea-
based assault capabilities and extensive medical facilities.61 Another article in the 
same published debate states, “Amphibious warships are able to shoulder or ac-
complish most of the tasks done by mid to small-size aircraft carriers, and are 
even able to engage in tasks that some of the carriers are unable to do.”62
It is in nontraditional security missions that China would likely employ air-
craft carriers and amphibious assault vessels in “far seas” operations. There is no 
evidence that China is developing sufficient force projection to launch a major 
offensive against another state; the level of capability it is likely seeking would be 
sufficient for a variety of other missions. Since late December 2008 the PLAN has 
maintained two warships (destroyers or frigates) and one supply ship in the Gulf 
of Aden in counterpiracy patrol, as well as, recently, LPD 998. These ships have 
escorted a substantial number of merchant vessels and deterred some pirate at-
tacks, but they lack the capability to take firm action against pirate bases ashore 
should they be called upon to do so. United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1851, passed unanimously in December 2008, authorizes operations 
against pirate bases on land in Somalia.63 No nation has taken such action under 
Modern force projection is essential for China 
to have a sustained naval presence away from 
Chinese waters, whether in the South China 
Sea, the Indian Ocean, or anywhere else.
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UNSCR 1851, but should the Chinese decide to do so, the small helicopters and 
modest special-operations troops now deployed with the destroyers and frig-
ates would be insufficient. LPD 998, with its larger Z-8 helicopters and LCACs 
(landing craft, air cushion), would make a PLAN group capable of acting under 
UNSCR 1851. Should the international community attempt to address piracy in 
Somalia by deploying a multinational force for peacekeeping and nation build-
ing, PLAN amphibious assault ships could offer transportation and logistics sup-
port to PLA soldiers involved.
Protecting Chinese citizens in nations bordering the Indian Ocean is another 
task that PLAN expeditionary units could carry out. It is estimated that over five 
million Chinese citizens live and work overseas, including forty-five thousand 
in Nigeria, twenty-four thousand in Sudan, ten thousand in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, and ten thousand in Pakistan. Chinese citizens living in 
unstable countries like these are increasingly at risk. In April 2007, seven Chinese 
oil workers were killed in Ethiopia; another five were abducted and murdered in 
Sudan in 2008. In 2004 three Chinese engineers were murdered in Gwadar, while 
in 2007 a busload of Chinese construction engineers was bombed in southwest-
ern Baluchistan, killing several policemen.64 Most recently, in July 2010 Chinese 
oil workers staying at a hotel in Gwadar were subjected to a rocket attack.65 Also, 
about half of the approximately two thousand Chinese soldiers currently de-
ployed on UN peacekeeping missions are in Sudan and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, nations where future instability could lead to a requirement for 
sea-based support.66
In May 2007 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) established a division 
of consular protection within the Department of Consular Affairs, MFA’s larg-
est department, with 140 staff in Beijing and more than six hundred at overseas 
consulates. Although diplomatic channels have secured the release of kidnapped 
Chinese citizens, including nine people in Nigeria in 2007 and twenty-five Chi-
nese sailors on the pirated coal carrier Dexinhai (released in December 2009 af-
ter payment of a four-million-dollar ransom), growing Chinese nationalism and 
confidence in the military could put pressure on Beijing to take more muscular 
action in the future.67 A naval task group built around one or more large am-
phibious vessels would be crucial in conducting a NEO or in providing over-the-
horizon support to Chinese peacekeepers. Amphibious assault ships would bring 
a wide range of capabilities to such a task, including diverse air wings, made up 
of transport, rescue, and attack helicopters; task group command and control; 
medical facilities; and marines and soldiers supplemented by specialists such as 
engineers and medical personnel. 
The February and March 2011 deployment of a single PLAN frigate and four 
PLAAF Il-76 transports to support a Chinese NEO in war-torn Libya are excellent 
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examples of the PLA’s need for greater expeditionary capability. While this mis-
sion represents the first time China deployed military forces to support a NEO, 
the PLA’s contribution to the mission was unimpressive. By the time PLAN and 
PLAAF forces arrived in theater, over 90 percent of the approximately thirty-five 
thousand Chinese citizens in Libya had already been evacuated, using chartered 
commercial ferries and aircraft. The mission generated a great deal of positive 
publicity for the PLA in the largest evacuation of Chinese citizens from a for-
eign country since the founding of the People’s Republic, and it demonstrated 
the PLA’s ability to respond quickly to execute its mission. However, the small 
role played by China’s military forces in this operation highlights its lack of sub-
stantive long-range expeditionary capabilities. That said, an indicator of a more 
robust role for the PLA in this type of mission is this March 2011 statement 
from Major General Luo Yuan of the Academy of Military Sciences in the Chi-
nese newspaper Xinhua: “If there’s an emergency and there are a huge number of 
overseas Chinese needing to be evacuated, then it’s quite necessary for the army 
to step in and help the government get them out.”
Given the likelihood that the primary focus of China’s future aircraft carri-
er fleet will be regional, any deployments of Chinese carrier groups outside the 
western Pacific will probably be to support nontraditional security missions or 
establish a peacetime presence. While not as useful as large amphibious assault 
ships for NEOs, counterpiracy, support to peacekeeping, and the like, carriers 
could provide air cover or rotary-wing support to Chinese forces engaged in 
these missions were it necessary. A carrier group deployed near a nation where 
Chinese citizens were threatened could also serve as a powerful instrument of 
diplomacy. Further, if the commitment elsewhere or unreadiness of other forces 
required, a carrier (though not ideally suited to the role) could put assault forces 
ashore against pirate lairs. The use of Kitty Hawk as an afloat forward staging base 
in 2001 for special-operations forces is instructive in this regard. China could 
also deploy carrier groups to the Indian Ocean periodically on goodwill cruises 
and bilateral or multilateral exercises. That peacetime presence might support 
nations important to China’s position in the region, such as Pakistan and Sudan, 
or effectively assert to regional actors that China’s interests and concerns are not 
to be ignored. 
China’s navy currently possesses only a modest long-range force-projection ca-
pability. However, between now and 2020 the acquisition of aircraft carriers and 
additional amphibious assault vessels will give it a robust capacity for expedition-
ary and force-projection operations in East Asia. It will also give the PLAN the 
ability to engage in small or medium-sized missions of these kinds both in and 
beyond East Asia—particularly in support of nontraditional security missions, 
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